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Abstract: Although the EU legal framework applicable to defence procurements is – given its 
very nature – of particular importance, very little structured information is available about it. 
Defence procurements have special status within the European public procurements, given their 
potential impacts on the essential (national) security interests of the Member States. The 
European regulation sets forth a legal framework for Member States, and it is the Member 
States that are liable for meeting the basic intentions of this regulation. The European 
Commission (if necessary, together with the Court of Justice of the European Union) ensures 
the compliance of the national legislations with the EU law, just as well the proper application 
of the aforementioned rules. The present article summarises the European legal framework 
specifically applicable to defence procurements, examines the transposition of the relevant EU 
directive, and certain additional interesting aspects. Due to obvious constraints, the detailed 
analysis of the laws of each Member State with regard to defence procurement is not possible – 
even though this is a very important further aspect to the topic. Also, one should be conscious 
about the fact that in case of defence procurements there are even more factors to be 
considered, such as international law or the security of supply. 
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1. Preface 
The national security is the first element of a trinity – hand in hand with the public order 
and health – on which field the Member States of the European Union conserve their 
powers and are very vigilant not to delegate their competences in any area having  
a reasonable point of contact with the above mentioned elements of the trinity.  
The regulation of defence procurements is a representative example for retained powers, 
as in the European Union the most of the defence procurements are exempted from 
Internal Market rules. Instead, these are regulated by the Member States, as it is their 
competence to define and protect their own security interests. As a result, the rules 
governing the defence sector’s procurements are divergent, and this has a negative 
impact on the competition as the lack of transparency may jeopardise the operation  
of the market participants. The European Union adopted several measures to facilitate 
the competition (and also the cooperation) within the defence sector of the Member 
States, and in particular to increase the market share of the small and medium-sized 
enterprises. The fragmentation also causes duplication of capabilities (e.g. the United 
States has 30 types of weapon systems and only 1 type of main battle tanks, while the 
EU has 178 weapon systems and 17 main battle tanks), which per se decreases the 
efficiency not just of the sector’s procurements, but also of the suppliers. [1] The 
European decision-makers agree with this and believe that the competitiveness of the 
technological and industrial base within the defence sector would increase as a result of 
opening the internal market for defence products. [2] 
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The fact that defence procurements are exempted from public procurements is well 
known on a general level. The professional review and analysis of the detailed rules 
however are hard to be found. The aim of the authors is to give a deeper view into the 
legal framework of the European Union concerning defence procurements and examine 
whether the EU legislation is fit for its purpose: striking the fair balance between 
national security interests and free and fair competition throughout the internal market.  
 
2. General legal background: TFEU 
The core background of the topic is Article 346 (former number 296) of the Treaty on 
Functioning of the European Union (hereinafter referred to as ‘Article 296’). This 
Article serves as basis for the application of national rules within the area of defence 
procurements. Article 296 sets out that the provisions of the Treaties shall not preclude 
the application of the following rules: [3] 
 no Member State shall be obliged to supply information for disclosure if it 
considers that the disclosure is contrary to the essential interests of its security, 
 any Member State may take such measures as it considers necessary for the 
protection of the essential interests of its security which are connected with the 
production of or trade in arms, munitions and war material; provided that such 
measures shall not adversely affect the conditions of competition in the internal 
market regarding products which are not intended for especially military 
purposes. 
 
3. The interpretative communication adopted by the European Commission 
The above cited rules are quite vague, thus the European Commission adopted an 
interpretative communication in 2006 on the application of Article 296 to clarify the 
legal framework (hereinafter referred to as the ‘Interpretative Communication’), based 
on a consultation which resulted in the following conclusions: [4] 
- there is uncertainty regarding the interpretation of Article 296, thus there are 
differences between the Member States regarding its application, 
- the Public Procurement Directive is not suitable for many defence contracts, 
even if the conditions set out in Article 296 are met. 
 
The Interpretative Communication lays down that a defence contract may rely on the 
exemption rule (that is Article 296) only if (i) the information that would be subject to 
disclosure is contrary to the essential interest of a Member State’s security, (ii) the 
subject of the contract is explicitly stated in Paragraph 2 of Article 296 and (iii) the 
conditions laid down in the case law of the Court of Justice of the European Union 
(hereinafter referred to as the ‘Court’) are fulfilled. The Interpretative Communication 
highlights that only security interest can justify an exemption, other interests such as 
industrial and economic interest cannot. Furthermore, such security interest shall be 
essential, which also further reduces the possible application of Article 296, which even 
itself reduces its own scope when setting out that its application shall not adversely 
affect the competition in the internal market with regard to the products, which are not 
intended for expressly military purposes. 
 
The importance of the Interpretative Communication derives from the fact that the 
European Commission has the competence to review whether the application of Article 
296 was justified or not. The concerned Member State has to cooperate in good faith 
with the Commission during such investigation and if the Commission considers that a 
Member State uses Article 296 improperly, the Commission may bring the case before 
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the Court. In the course of such proceedings the burden of proof lies with the concerned 
Member State. Of course, absolute confidentiality is guaranteed during and following 
the procedure of the Commission and / or the Court.  
 
4. Strategy for a more competitive European defence industry 
The clarification of the legal background is not all what the European Commission has 
done. In order to make more competitive the European defence industry, it adopted a 
strategy on 5 December 2007: the Strategy for more competitive European defence 
industry (hereinafter referred to as the ‘Strategy’). [5] The Commission identified three 
areas in which a better coordination would be necessary between the Member States. 
First of all, the Member States have to adapt their development and procurement 
programs. Second, the researches shall be coordinated at Union level. Third, the small 
and medium-sized enterprises positions shall be strengthened. The Commission 
proposed in the Strategy for the Member States to adopt two directives: one directive to 
facilitate intra-EU transfer of defence products by reducing administration, for example 
simplifying national licensing procedures, while the other directive would aim to 
enhance the openness and competitiveness of defence procurements.  
 
5. Directive 2009/81/EC 
Against the above background, the European Parliament and the Council adopted 
Directive 2009/81/EC on 13 July 2009 on the coordination of procedures for the award 
of certain works contracts, supply contracts and service contracts by contracting 
authorities or entities in the fields of defence and security (hereinafter referred to as the 
‘Directive’). [6] The Directive regulates the defence procedure in five Titles consisting 
of seventy-five Articles. 
The Directive declares in its preamble that none of its provisions should prevent the 
imposition or application of any measures, which is necessary for a Member State to 
defend its interests approved by the Treaties. In order to provide a tool for this, Article 
16 sets forth that the contracts regulated by the Directive may be exempted from the 
measures of the Directive, provided that such exemption is necessary for the protection 
of the essential security interests of a Member State. The Member States have the right 
to assess whether the measures of the Directive are proper to protect their essential 
security interests or not.  
In addition, the Directive enumerates several cases when its provisions are not 
applicable, such as (i) in cases where special rules apply which derive from international 
agreements or arrangements between Member States and third countries, (ii) where 
rules relating to the stationing of troops apply, (iii) in case of agreements awarded by 
international organisations for their purposes or agreements which must be awarded by 
a Member State under the rules that are specific to such organisations, (iv) regarding 
procurements conducted by intelligence services and procurements for all type of 
security services, (v) with regard to sensitive purchases which require a remarkably high 
level of confidentiality, such as procurements for border protection, combating terrorism 
or organised crime and covert activities, (vi) when Member States conduct cooperative 
programmes to develop new defence equipment, (vii) for armed or security forces 
which conduct operations beyond the borders of the European Union concerning 
purchases where the contracted parties are located in the area of the operation, including 
civilian purchases directly connected to the conduct of the operation, (vii) in case of 
purchases of works and services between governments, (viii) regarding the acquisition 
or rental of immovable property or rights related to such property, (ix) for arbitration 
and conciliation services, (x) for financial services and (xi) co-financing of research and 
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development programmes. The Directive (based on the EU’s fundamental values) also 
declares additional exemptions to facilitate the sheltered workshops and sheltered 
employment programs, as the integration or reintegration of people with disabilities 
in labour market is a key object of the European Union’s Social Policy. The core values 
of the European Union appear as a basic idea in case of several measures, for example, 
the Directive sets out that a potential subcontractor should not be discriminated 
on grounds of nationality; performance conditions of the contract shall not 
be discriminatory; in case of verification of economic operators with respect to security 
information the verification should be carried out in accordance with the principles 
of non-discrimination, equal treatment and proportionality; and contracts should 
be awarded on the basis of objective criteria observing the principles of transparency, 
non-discrimination, equal treatment and proportionality. The Directive refers 
to principles related to internal market which are set forth in the Treaties, and also refers 
to general fundamental principles as well, which have been introduced into the Union 
law by the Court. [7] 
The Directive contains provisions ensuring the compliance with transparency and 
competition obligations, e.g. it enables to challenge the award procedure – of course 
necessitating such ‘review procedures’ to take into account the protection of defence 
and security interests. Title IV of the Directive specifically sets out the scope and 
availability of such review procedures, and also the requirements, the applicable 
deadlines and the possible sanctions related to them. 
The Directive can be seen as a relatively flexible instrument: it allows the conclusion 
of framework agreements as well, provided that they are concluded for a maximum 
period of seven years. The use of electronic purchasing techniques is also allowed, 
however only those subjects that can be expressed in figures or percentages may be the 
object of electronic auctions, and the principles of equal treatment, non-discrimination 
and transparency shall be respected. Finally, a flexibly approach is further strengthened 
by the fact that (for obvious reasons) the contracting authority is entitled to exclude an 
economic operator at any point of the procurement process if it has information that 
the concerned economic operator could cause a risk to the essential security interests 
of that Member State. 
 
6. Transposition of the Directive 
The transposition of the Directive is an obligation for the Member States, with an 
applicable deadline of 21 August 2011. Given that directives are flexible instruments, 
the Member States can ensure in the course of the transposition to have their national 
characteristics articulated – of course, provided that objectives of the directive are 
achieved. Thus, it is equally important that the Member States adopt measure that are 
capable of transposing the Directive completely and correctly, just as it is important 
to properly apply them. The European Commission observes the transposition and 
the proper application, and prepares a report on these matters to the European 
Parliament and the Council. According to the report of the European Commission on 
transposition of the Directive [8], only three Member States notified the European 
Commission until 21 August 2011 about the complete transposition and four Member 
States within did the same within further one month. The European Commission thus 
opened infringement procedures against as many as 23 Member States. The result 
of these procedures was in almost every case that the Member State concerned fulfilled 
its obligation - there were only four Member States not notifying the Commission by 
July 2012 about the transposition or partially disposition of the Directive. The European 
Commission established that those Member States who transposed the Directive as 
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of July 2012 have – prima facie – done this correctly, and that many Member States 
transposed the non-compulsory subcontracting provisions as well. 
The European Commission summarized the national implementing measures regarding 
(i) the scope of the Directive, (ii) the exclusions from the application of the Directive, 
(iii) the provisions relating to subcontracting, and (iv) the review mechanism.  
With regard to exclusions from the application of the Directive, the Commission 
concluded that the Member States transposed the Directive mostly correctly. However, 
the Commission established that in a number of cases the wording of the national 
implementing measures changed the material scope of the Directive. E.g. according 
to Article 13(a) the Directive does not apply to contracts where the application of the 
Directive would oblige a Member State to supply information the disclosure of which it 
considers contrary to the essential interests of its security. Now, a Member State, with 
reference to this Article, excluded all contracts where publication would lead 
to disclosure of classified information, while another Member State has not transposed 
this Article at all.  
The findings of the Commission regarding the transposition of the review mechanism 
necessitates particular attention. The applied solutions of the Member States in the 
course of the disposition of these provisions can be divided into two parts. According to 
the report of the European Commission, cca. half of the Member States transposed the 
provisions on review mechanisms within their general rules on remedies, while the 
other half of the Member States transposed these by means of a specific national 
implementing measure.  
If we take a closer look at the details of the review procedures, there are two important 
aspects that need to be observed. First, the Directive provides a possibility for the 
Member States to set up a specific body having as sole jurisdiction the review 
of contracts concerning defence and security in order to guarantee the confidentiality 
of classified information – interestingly enough, none of the Member States opted for 
this solution, and only a few Member States have adopted specific rules requiring 
security clearance from the members of the review body. Second, according to the 
wording of the Directive, the review body is not entitled to consider a contract 
ineffective if the consequences of the ineffectiveness would seriously endanger the 
essential security interest of a Member State. The Commission concluded that all but 
two Member Sates have included wording in their local laws making it possible 
to abstain from declaring a contract ineffective. The findings of the European 
Commission and the reports on the transpositions are not end in themselves, these 
findings help the Member States to improve the transposition of the Directives and 
to standardise the legal frameworks – even in an area which is as sensitive as 
the defence procurement - within the European Union. 
 
7. Electronic Bulletin Board 
The creation of the proper legal background as detailed above has of course great 
importance. However, the importance of certain practical solutions aiming at the 
integration of the European defence market shall not be underestimated either. A good 
example is the Electronic Bulletin Board, launched by the European Defence Agency on 
1 July 2006 with the goal of providing opportunity for suppliers across Europe to bid for 
defence contracts in the European Union. [9] This webpage brings together the buyers 
and the suppliers, promoting the fair and equal opportunities for all participants. With 
the advertisement of the subcontract opportunities, the Electronic Bulletin Board fosters 
a more open, fair and competitive market throughout the supply chain. 
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8. Summary 
In view of the above detailed legal framework, we can conclude that the decision 
makers do their best to achieve the establishment of a common defence market within 
the European Union. However, the legislator has a difficult task, given that any 
derogation from the Treaties affect the fundamental principles and the objectives of the 
Internal Market, thus the related regulation shall be clear and accurate, with full respect 
for the principle of necessity. With regard to the exclusions from the application of the 
Directive, we shall note that these exclusions (given their broad nature and the already 
mentioned “flexibility”) have negative impact on the essentially necessary competition, 
which competition is useful for the consumers and – in our case this is even more 
important – fosters the innovation. [10]  
Given that the above described method of regulation, that is the very nature 
of a directive, allows the Member States to choose how they accomplish the objectives 
set forth at supra-national level, the transposition of the Directive by each and every 
Member State is certainly a good topic for further research – this is something 
the authors are looking forward to become engaged in.  
Such research would be important as specifically defining the applicable legal rules 
in case of defence procurement projects by the affected parties may cause difficulties, 
given that they have to take into account their domestic laws, the Union law, 
the international law and the even the procurement rules of the organisation or the entity 
which manages the program. According to some, the legislation regarding defence 
procurement shall leave less loopholes, facilitating the more certain definition of the 
applicable legislation. [11] 
In conclusion, we can summarise that the ultimate aim of the existing EU legislation is 
to increase the competition and decrease the fragmentation in the defence market, and 
further to establish a European Defence Equipment Market and a European Defence 
Technological Industrial Base. Still, as the national security of the Member States is one 
of their essential interests, being the exclusive competence of the Member States for 
decades passed and (probably) for decades to come, we may feel free to assume that 
barrier-free regulation of the defence procurements, or even a less flexible approach 
within the frame of the intergovernmental cooperation is not to be expected. 
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